Jean Fournet, Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO
It is my pleasure today to attend this Eurasian Media Forum Conference at the invitation of Mrs. Dariga Nazarbayeva, Chair of the Organizing Committee.
It is an honour to attend this Conference in the company of so many renowned speakers and attendees, be they from the political side, the media side, the economic side or the scholarly one.
It is my privilege to be here today, as representative of Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, to speak on the political aspects of dangerously increasing threats in the world and the role and impact of the international media on public understanding of these critical issues.
And, on a more personal basis, allow me to express the following:
— It is my first visit to Kazakhstan
- no need to say that I was excited by the perspective of this mission
- and that I am delighted by what I now know about my agenda for the coming days
You may also be interested to know that in this capacity I am not only responsible for information and communication (press, media, website, publications, conferences, PR,.….) but also for the Science Programme and all the activities linked to the challenges of modern society (environmental impact of military activities, scarcity of resources, new threats to security). In sum, working and networking with opinion formers from all sections of society.
This may be a long explanation of what I do. Indeed to make it shorter means I am the right person to be here today.
If so, what is the message? Three points:
- What can NATO do, in general terms, to help the media play its fundamental role in a fully democratic society?
- Which lessons can be drawn from the Kosovo campaign, and what can we learn from the Iraq war?
- Which recommendations or advice should we propose.
1. What can NATO do to help the media play its fundamental role in a fully democratic society?
• first, give media open access to accurate information on NATO policies, operations, evolutions, …
1. = NATO is a provider of information
2. = NATO provides a knowledge base to understand key security issues
• second, provide this information on a regular basis through an open and constructive dialogue
1. = communiques
2. = press focus
3. = website regularly updated
4. = points de presse or press conference as required
5. = conferences
• third, give primary role in these contacts with the media to a media service composed of easily accessible professionals having a good knowledge of what is going on in the organization and a trustful relationship with the journalists.
• fourth, in time of conflict, be the point of reference for accuracy. And since the closest experience NATO had of dealing with the media in a conflictual environment has been during the air campaign waged against the Milosevic regime let me expand on this a little while.
2. Lessons learnt
2.1
• In Kosovo, the air campaign was launched to stop the human rights abuses carried out by Milosevic security forces against the Kosovo Albanians. But these wars are hard to wage for democracies. Because these conflicts, defending values, are also expected to bring political results at the least military cost.
• Consequently, during our campaign our main responsibility, in terms of information, was to convince the public opinion of the 19 countries making up NATO - of 19 democracies - that this war was legitimate, so public support would not be lacking.
Because the rules of NATO are clear it would have taken only one country to say no and stop the air campaign.
Convincing of course also applied to countries such as Russia or the Serbian people, but remember that in Yugoslavia, we had no access to the media, while, Milosevic supporters were widely seen on Western outlets.
• Three principles guided our approach to the press - and that of our military:
1. The first principle is that means should be proportionate to the end, in other words a military action should be proportionate to its result.
2. Second principle: civilian and military targets shall be distinguished. Out of 23,000 bombs dropped on Yugoslavia, only 30 were badly directed, which is less than 0.1%. In other words a success rate of 99.9% - quite amazing, no matter how high the pilots were flying.
3. Third principle: that the overall price to pay was proportionate to the final objective. In Kosovo, this meant stopping the human rights abuses carried out against the Albanians. And the result was there.
• In our relationship with the media we reminded the journalists of these principles and we always tried to stick to these lines. If, sometimes, there were uncertainties regarding military operations, it is because it is simply difficult to know everything that is going on in a war theatre, what Clausewitz used to call the "fog of war", while, on the other hand, journalists live in the "dictatorship of real time" which is hard to reconcile with Clausewitz's view
2.2 It is clearly impossible to discuss security or media and war today without discussing Iraq. But it is also very difficult to draw a clear picture because of the proximity to the event.
Once again it's a problem of media perspective. As you all know, during conflicts militaries put their theories and experimental technologies to the test where it counts - in the field. Apparently the world's media is adopting the same practice. Because for the first time, we are seeing journalists from around the world "embedded" in military formations - from front-line combat units to support services, and everything in-between.
This is radically new. Journalists are getting an absolutely unprecedented view of the battlefield. And they are conveying it straight to television viewers, radio listeners and internet users, in real time. Never, in the history of combat journalism, has there been this breadth of coverage of a military campaign.
But this breadth of information, from embedded journalists, has not necessarily led to depth of understanding. True, there is a constant stream of reports, more than one could possibly follow, from every corner of the theatre of operations. But information is not perspective. And the reports at the tactical level threaten, almost paradoxically, to undermine our understanding of what is happening at the strategic level.
This is not to criticise the journalists. They are reporting what they see. But the overall danger is clear: if you focus too much on the individual battles, you can lose sight of the big picture.
This 24/7 coverage also raised expectations and increased the pressure in terms of running a "clean" war. (Short with limited casualties and no errors.)
2.3 Can we draw directions for the future from these recent experiences? A few perspectives:
• Democratic leaders have to justify wars to their public opinion since they need their moral and financial support.
= this means a great deal of explanation and capability to convince.
• Opinion formers have to be honest about the information they give: it's a matter of credibility.
• Iraq has shown a new challenge: too much information blurs the picture.
• Journalists on one side and politicians and public servants on the other side have to educate the public.
• • Responsible media should pay as much attention to peace-building as to war itself.
• • What is visible and showable is only the tip of the iceberg: but winning a war relies also on : secret operations and negotiations; political and military resolve; strategic plans.
And if I had to express all these ideas in very unique and easily memorable words I would make two points:
• the journalists are not paid to win wars, but to cover them; this gives them a tremendous margin of manoeuvre whereby they can preserve some sort of independence in a way no-one else can do;
• stay engaged!
And now I would like to use the opportunity of my presence at this Conference to briefly update you on NATO's agenda.
NATO's TRANSFORMATION CONTINUES
The most significant moment in that transformation took place in November 2002. NATO's Heads of State and Government met at a Summit meeting in Prague that I believe will go down in history, for two reasons. First, because it transformed NATO's policies, membership and partnerships to reorient the Alliance for the 21st century. And second, because it was the first major indication of the future shape of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation.
Let me remind you of this agenda.
Terrorism & WMD
• Terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction are recognised as key 21st century security threats that NATO must help to meet. Following decisions taken at the Prague Summit, NATO is now busy gearing its policies, structures and capabilities to meeting these threats.
What does that mean?
• We are implementing a new military concept for defence against terrorism - which foresees NATO lending support to international coalitions, and NATO forces acting where and when required.
• We are implementing various Prague Summit initiatives on NBC defence and new missile defence feasibility study.
• We are keen to engage our Partner countries in NATO's effort to combat terrorism and WMD proliferation, notably through the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T).
Capabilities
• Changing concepts and policies is one thing, but we must have capabilities to implement them. The Prague Summit has also launched a determined effort to acquire these capabilities.
• NATO Response Force: - 20,000 strong elite response force - goal is full operational capability by 2006, and initial capability by next year - boost to interoperability - compatible with ongoing EU's capabilities effort.
• Prague Capabilities Commitment is a firm commitment to specific improvements in critical areas such as strategic airlift, air refuelling, and precision-guided munitions.
• Streamlining command structure is necessary
Enlargement
• Accession Protocols with seven invitees have been signed by the Allies. They are now for ratification according to national procedures in each of the 19 current NATO member countries. Invitees should be able to accede by Spring 2004 but reform in invitee countries must continue until then and beyond.
• NATO's door remains open, and the enlargement process continues.
Partnership
• EAPC/PfP: - there is a greater focus on terrorism and WMD (PAP-T), as well as on security sector reform and a greater effort to individualise cooperation through individual Partnership Action Plans - but we are aware also of special needs, concerns and importance of specific regions, including Central Asia.
• NATO-Russia Council: - significant progress have been made since May last year - terrorism, WMD, peacekeeping - and still considerable untapped potential.
• Ukraine remains key partner. Its stability is crucial for Europe as a whole, also to Russia. NATO-Ukraine Action Plan designed to help with Ukraine's democratic transformation.
• Enhancing NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue in light of "9/11" and more recent developments in the Middle East.
NATO-EU
• Finally, theory and practice are in sync. Permanent institutional relations have been established, and earlier this month the EU has taken over the NATO-led operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia . First concrete manifestation of fundamentally new burden-sharing, and a more sustainable transatlantic relationship.
• Potential for much closer interaction, reaching well beyond crisis management, especially when 15 nations will be members of both NATO and the EU as the two organizations enlarge next year.
As a general conclusion let me say:
• The international community is struggling through the Iraq crisis and nations and institutions - including NATO - continue to adjust to the post 9/11 security environment.
• But overall, there is a strong and broad agenda of consensus and cooperation both within Europe and across the Atlantic. Europe and North America continue to share a common vision, and a determination to act together.
• NATO will remain the principal, indeed only vehicle for effective, long-term transatlantic security cooperation in the 21st century.
• And last but not least there is a strong role to play for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the involvement of Partner Countries in these fights against new threats.
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